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Labor Law
by Stephen W. Mooney*
and
Leigh Lawson Reeves"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the 1995 decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that addressed issues in the areas of
traditional labor law. This Article specifically discusses decisions by the
Eleventh Circuit under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA),' the
Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 2 the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 ("FLSA"),5 and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 ("ERISA7).4
Unlike the past few years, this survey year the Eleventh Circuit did
not decide many cases which involved labor law issues. There were
numerous unpublished opinions by the Eleventh Circuit dealing with the
activities of various labor unions, their elections, and the interpretation
of certain collective bargaining agreements. These unpublished opinions,
however, are not considered binding precedent. This year, the Eleventh
Circuit's published opinions appear to have focused more on the
interpretation of certain guidelines in the FLSA, as well as the ERISA
statute. ThisArticle does not attempt to address all the cases decided
by the Eleventh Circuit that touched upon these traditional areas of

* Partner in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia Institute
of Technology (B.S.I.M., 1983); Texas Tech University School of Law (J.D., 1987). Member,
State Bar of Georgia' and State Bar of Texas.
** Associate in the firm of Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.S., 1985); Mercer University (J.D., magna cum laude, 1991). Member, Mercer
Law Review (1989-1991); Senior Managing Editor (1990-1991). Member, State Bar of
Georgia and State Bar of South Carolina.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988).
2. Id §§ 141-187.
3. Id §§ 209-219.
4. Id. §§ 1001-1461.
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labor law. Instead, the Article addresses some of the more noteworthy
decisions by the Eleventh Circuit in 1995 and attempts to provide
practical guidance to the practitioner for these types of claims.
II. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT

In the case of Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc.,' the Eleventh
Circuit addressed the issue of whether the Georgia state law claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress was pre-empted by section 301
of the LMRA. Interestingly enough, the court made the determination
that the LMRA did not pre-empt the Georgia state law claim, and
therefore, the plaintiff was allowed to proceed with his state law claim
against his employer.6
Specifically, the plaintiff, Lightning, worked as a janitor for Roadway
Trucking Company from February 1988 until his discharge in August
1990.' Lightning initially served as an on-call employee but eventually
received regular employee status. As a regular employee, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 728 ("Union")
represented his interests at the Roadway terminal in which he worked.
The collective bargaining agreement between Roadway and the Union
allowed for "progressive discipline," but it also granted employees the
right to file a grievance against the employer regarding any discipline
imposed upon them.8
It was undisputed that Lightning's job performance had been less than
marginal during the years he had worked for Roadway. Specifically,
Roadway management had discussed with him several times about
violating certain collective bargaining agreement company rules, such as
wasting time, failing to follow instructions, and failing to wear steel-toed
shoes. Due to these numerous work rule violations, Roadway dismissed
Lightning several times during his work history with them. Roadway
always reinstated Lightning, however, until his final discharge in
August 1990. 9
The record showed that Roadway supervisors had verbally abused
Lightning on numerous occasions. The verbal abuse usually included
profanity and encouragement by Roadway supervisors for Lightning o

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

60 F.3d 1551 (11th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1557.
Id. at 1554.
Id.
Id.
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leave the company. Moreover, Lightning received several telephone calls
at home telling him to resign his position.'0
The court found two particular encounters between Roadway
supervisors and Lightning to be especially egregious. The first incident
commenced when a supervisor complained about how Lightning was
sweeping his area and actually spit in Lightning's face and told him,
"Who do you think you are?" and "You ain't no better than a janitor."
The second incident occurred when Lightning commented that a certain
supervisor, Mark Keahon, was the only individual who treated him with
decency. When Keahon heard of this comment, he called Lightning into
his office and criticized him about his work performance. The conversation became very hostile, and Lightning requested the presence of a
union steward. Keahon responded, "Fuck the union steward" and "Get
your sorry ass out of here." Lightning returned with the union steward,
and during the heated conversation that ensued, Keahon actually tried
to hit Lightning. 1
Eventually, Lightning began to suffer from psychotic episodes, which
included manifestations of paranoid delusions. He was later admitted
into Georgia Mental Health Institute, where the physicians diagnosed
his problems as being "work related." Shortly thereafter, Lightning
resigned his position in August 1990.12
A few months thereafter, Lightning brought suit against Roadway in
state court alleging that Roadway had breached his contract by
committing violations of the collective bargaining agreement, engaging
in intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as assault.
Roadway removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia and moved for summary judgment on the
following grounds: (1) federal law pre-empted Lightning's breach of
contract claim; (2) federal law pre-empted Lightning's intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim; (3) Roadway's alleged conduct did
not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of
law; and (4) the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act provided the
exclusive remedy for Lightning's assault claim. The district court
granted Roadway's motion in part, finding that the federal labor law did
pre-empt Lightning's contract claim, but otherwise, the district court
denied Roadway's motions. After conducting a nonjury trial, the court
entered judgment for Lightning and awarded him approximately

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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$150,000 in damages. Shortly thereafter, Roadway filed their appeal to
the court of appeals."3
Among other arguments, Roadway contended that the resolution of
Lightning's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim depended
upon the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, and
therefore, section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act would preempt his claim. The Eleventh Circuit noted that whether section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act pre-empted a state law claim was14
necessarily a question of law and, therefore, subject to de nouo review.
Section 301(a) of the LMRA provides:
Suits for violation of a contract between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce
...may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy
or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."3
Consequently, section 301 not only grants federal courts jurisdiction over
employment disputes involving collective bargaining agreements, it also
expresses a federal policy that federal substantive law should apply
under section 301(a), rather than any type of state substantive law.'
The Eleventh Circuit then cited the case of Lingle v. Norge, Inc., 7 in
which the Supreme Court of the United States outlined the principles
behind section 301 and the pre-emption doctrine:
[If] the resolution of a state law claim depends upon the meaning of a
collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law (which

might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state
law principles as there are states) is pre-empted and federal labor law
principles-necessarily uniform throughout the nation-must be

employed to resolve the dispute. 8

In other words, if the only way Lightning's state law claim could be
resolved, was if there was some type of interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement, then that particular state law would be preempted. The Eleventh Circuit, however, found that Lightning's
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim did not require

13.

Id. at 1555-56.

14. Id.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 1556 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)).
Id. (citations omitted).
486 U.S. 399 (1988).
60 F.3d at 1556 (citations omitted).
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interpretation of the collective bargaining agreementand, therefore, he
was free to go forward with the claim. 9
Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Lightning's intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim required scrutiny of the actual
treatment he received by his employers while working at Roadway.
There was no dispute concerning the terms and conditions of his
employment; rather, it was simply "severe abuse [that] he endured from
Roadway supervisors." 0 The fact that Roadway management verbally
abused Lightning on several occasions and actually spat on him on one
occasion, demonstrated that the facts in his claim were not in any way
"arguably sanctioned by the labor contract."2 ' Accordingly, section 301
was found not to pre-empt Lightning's intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim.22
A careful review of Lightning demonstrates that even if an employee
is part of a labor union and is governed by a collective bargaining
agreement, a lawsuit he wishes to bring against his employer will not
always be scrutinized under the federal labor laws. Instead, the
Eleventh Circuit has now specifically given an example of certain
actions, on the part of an employer, that would be found to be well
outside of the terms and/or understandings of any collective bargaining
agreement. Thus, if an employer engages in such egregious conduct as
noted above, they may well not only be liable under the National Labor
Relations Act or the Labor Management Relations Act, but also under
state law tort claims as well.

III. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
This past survey year, the Eleventh Circuit decided several Fair Labor
Standards Act cases. This survey year is unique, however, in that they
specifically address a somewhat obscure exception to the FLSA
requirements involving amusement or recreational establishments. In
addition, the court specifically discussed 'a retaliation provision under
the FLSA and the burden of proof that the moving party must be able
to carry when alleging their termination was in direct response to a
claim under the FLSA.

19.
20.
21.
1987)).
22.

Id. at 1556-57.
Id. at 1557.
rd. (citing Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 825 F.2d 133, 138 n.6 (7th Cir.
Id.
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Exceptions

In Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit further
delineated the exception to FLSA requirements provided to "recreational
establishments." Specifically, in Jeffery, a grounds keeper brought an
action against his employer, which operated major league spring training
and minor league baseball games, alleging that they had violated the
Fair Labor Standards Act by failing to pay him for overtime. The facts
reveal that as grounds keeper, the plaintiff received the same salary
each week regardless of the number of hours he worked. The defendant
moved for summary judgment, arguing that pursuant to 29 U.S.C.
§ 213(a)(2), the overtime provisions of the FLSA would not apply to
employees such as the plaintiff because he was employed by an
"amusement or recreational establishment" and, as such, the defendant's
average receipts in any six month period did not exceed one-third of the
receipts from the other six months of the year. After reviewing all of the
evidence, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the defendants and found
that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim as a matter of law.2'
Specifically, the court noted that 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3), stated:
(a) The provisions of Section 206 ... and Section 207 of this title
[overtime provisions] shall not apply with respect to(3) any employee employed by an establishment which is an anusement or recreational establishment, organized camp, or religious or
nonprofit educational conference center, if (A) it does not operate for
more than seven months in any calendar year, or (B) during the
preceeding calendar year, its average receipts for any six months of
such year were not more than 33 1/3 per centum of its average receipts
for the other six months of such year .... 21
The court further stated, however, that exceptions such as this are
always construed narrowly against the employer who asserts them.26
Moreover, in these circumstances, the employer has the burden of
proving that it is entitled to the exemption, and in this particular case,
the critical question to be determined was whether the defendant's
business was both a recreational, as well as seasonal, type of busi27
ness.
In defining what type of establishment qualified as an amusemeit or
recreational establishment, the court noted that "sports events" are

23. 64 F.3d 590 (11th Cir. 1995).
24. Id. at 591.
25. Id. at 594 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(3)).

26. Id. (citations omitted).
27. Id.
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among those types of recreational activities specifically considered by
Congress to be covered under this exemption.2" The mere fact that the
defendant did not own the sports complex in which it operated was not
a determining factor. Since sports events were held in this area on a
regular basis, the court found that the establishment was "frequented by
the public for its amusement or recreation" and, thus, was legally
considered an amusement or recreational establishment.2
The next inquiry, whether the defendant's business was seasonal, was
determined by the amount of money the business received, as well as the
time in which the business received the most money. Specifically, the
court stated the test was whether the defendant's average receipts for
any six months were never more than one-third of the average receipts
for the other six months.30 The defendant established that during its
six months of off-season, from September through April, they clearly
made less than one-third of the receipts they received in the other six
months, beginning in March and ending in August. Virtually all of the
defendant's receipts were derived from spring training games played at
the complex in March and minor league games played at the complex
from April to August. Based upon the documentation the defendant
presented concerning their yearly receipts, the court found that they
were entitled to this exemption, and thus, the plaintiff did not have
grounds to continue to pursue his claim for overtime pay pursuant to the
FLSA.3'
B. Anti-Retaliation Provision of the FLSA
2 the Eleventh Circuit fully
In the seminal case of Reich v. Davis,"
delineated what the "motivating factor" test required in relation to the
anti-retaliation provisions of the FLSA. In Reich, two employees,
Darlene Smiley and Cynthia Fellows, worked for John Davis, a certified
public accountant. Davis properly paid his employees overtime during
the tax season, which lasted from roughly January to April, but for the
rest of the year, he did not pay his workers extra wages for working
overtime. Instead, during that period of time, he would allow his
employees "compensatory leave." In the fall of 1996, Smiley asked Davis
to pay her the extra wages to which she was entitled, but Davis refused.
Smiley filed a written complaint against Davis with the Wage and Hour
Division of the Department of Labor, and after an investigation, they

28. Id. at 595 (citations omitted).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 596-97.
32. 50 F.3d 962 (11th Cir. 1995).
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informed Davis that his system of using compensatory leave in lieu of
extra wages for overtime was unlawful. Consequently, Davis computed
the unpaid overtime wages he owed each of his five employees, and on
September 20, 1988, he mailed back wage checks to three of his
employees. Three days later, however, he called Smiley and Fellows into
his office, handed them their back wage checks, and fired them.3
Following their discharge, Smiley and Fellows both filed successful
state unemployment compensation claims against Davis. In contesting
their claims, Davis listed on an unemployment compensation form
several reasons why he discharged them. One of the reasons he listed
was his belief that both Smiley and Fellows had conspired together to
file a "false claim" with the Federal Wage and Hour Board.34
The Secretary of Labor then brought this lawsuit to permanently
enjoin Davis from violating section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA, which prohibits
an employer from discharging an employee in retaliation against the
employee's filing of a claim or testifying in an investigation lead by the
Wage and Hour Division. The Secretary of Labor was also requesting
that both Smiley and Fellows be reinstated and receive the backpay that
they were entitled to. After a hearing before the district court,
the
35
district court entered judgment in favor of Davis, the defendant.
The plaintiffs appealed, and at issue on appeal was the proper
interpretation of section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA which states:
[T]o discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused
to be instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has
testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or
is about to serve on an industry committee...
The defendant argued that he did not violate the anti-retaliation
provisions of the FLSA because the filing of the claim was not the reason
he fired Smiley and Fellows. The record established without dispute,
however, that Davis did list the filing of said claim as one of the reasons
he fired the two employees.37
While the district court agreed with this argument of the defendant,
the court of appeals stated that this finding by the district court was
truly "clearly erroneous." The Eleventh Circuit noted that although
there was substantial deference to be given to a trial court's findings of
fact, when the testimony of the witness that the trial court believes to
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 963.
Id.
Id. at 964.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C.A. § 215(a)(3) (West 1965)).
Id
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be credible, is totally contradicted by documentary evidence, then the
finding would be erroneous. 8 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit found that no
matter what the defendant was saying at this point, one of the reasons
he did fire Smiley and Fellows was because of their establishment of the
wage and hour complaint. 9
The defendant then argued that even if their establishment of the
wage and hour complaint was a determining factor in their termination,
it was not the sole determining factor and, thus, he had not violated the
retaliation provisions of the FLSA. Based upon the interpretation of the
anti-retaliation provision in other jurisdictions, the court agreed with the
defendant and found that the retaliation must be the "but for" reason for
termination before any terminated employee would be entitled to relief
under section 15(a)(3) of the FLSA ° In other words, even if there
were other legitimate business reasons for discharging Smiley and
Fellows, if their filing of the wage complaint was the "immediate cause
or motivating" factor for the termination, then the discharge violated
section 15(a)(3).
After reviewing the factual record in more detail,'the court found that
a remand was needed in this case and instructed the district court to
take as fact that both Smiley and Fellows' termination had something
to do with their wage and hour claim and then proceed to make a factual
of whether Smiley and Fellows would have been fired
determination
41
anyway.

This "but for" test can also be categorized as the "last straw that broke
the camel's back" test. Thus, only if an employer can prove that the
employee would have been fired anyway, can they successfully defend a
retaliation claim under the FLSA.
IV. THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT

As in years past, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
("ERISA") was the subject of several Eleventh Circuit decisions this past
survey year. The litigation in this area is becoming more prevalent, and
in fact, a survey article addressing solely ERISA issues could be of
benefit in the future. Due to space limitations, this Article will only
address a few of the cases decided this past survey year.

38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 965. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985).
50 F.3d at 965.
Id.
Id. at 966.
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Standard of Review for District Court
In Florence Nightingale Nursing Service, Inc. v. Blue Cross/Blue
Shield,42 the healthcare provider ("Nightingale") brought suit against
the claims administrator ("Blue Cross") after they denied its claim under
the employer's self-funded benefit plan. The facts revealed that
Nightingale provided skilled home nursing care to Mr. Frank Lungarella
("Lungarella"), who was in the later stages of the AIDS virus. Prior to
the on-set of his illness, Lungarella had worked .as an employee for
Intergraph. Corporation and was covered by their medical benefits plan
("the Plan"). This plan was governed by ERISA, and Blue Cross was the
claims administrator.4 3
The Plan provided that private-duty skilled nursing care was a
covered benefit to the extent that such care was considered "medically
necessary." The Plan did not cover "custodial care" because the Plan did
not deem skilled nursing in a private home environment "medically
necessary." Nightingale billed Blue Cross for the services they rendered
to Lungarella during the period of time that Lungarella underwent
intravenous treatment at his home. Blue Cross paid for this in-home
care, but after the IV was discontinued, Blue Cross took the position that
the in-home care was no longer "medically necessary," and since
Lungarella was under "custodial care," the skilled nursing would no
longer be covered. Essentially, Blue Cross maintained that Lungarella's
family was capable of providing all of the care he needed after the IV
was removed."
In addition to denying the care after the IV was removed, Blue Cross
also significantly reduced Nightingale's bills and, in fact, agreed to pay
Nightingale only one-third of what their actual hourly rate was. It was
later uncovered that prior to Nightingale even providing these services,
the owner of Nightingale had spoken over the telephone with a
representative from Blue Cross, who assured them that their services
would be covered and that they would be reimbursed one hundred
percent for the private-duty nursing. In fact, Nightingale wrote a letter
to Blue Cross confirming this conversation, but at trial, Blue Cross was
unable to produce this letter.4
Lungarella died on September 5, 1987, and shortly thereafter,
Nightingale filed suit in the Superior Court of the State of California.
Blue Cross removed the case to the United States District Court for the

42. 41 F.3d 1476 (11th Cir. 1995).
43. Id. at 1478-79,
44, Id. at 1479-80.
45. Id. at 1479.
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Central Division of California. The court subsequently transferred the
case to the Northern District of Alabama. One of Blue Cross's first
defenses was that Nightingale had failed to exhaust all internal
administrative remedies available under their benefit plan. Thus, the
district court dismissed the action without prejudice and ordered that
Nightingale pursue the internal administrative remedies available to
them."
Under the Plan, the parties were to submit their contentions to one of
the claims administrators within the Blue Cross organization. Dr. Renee
Holloway, as the Blue Cross assistant medical director and chief claims
examiner, was given the authority to review the facts and evaluate the
validity of Nightingale's allegations. Holloway did not conduct an oral
argument hearing and, instead, relied solely on written documentation.
She also considered Blue Cross's internal guidelines and materials
regarding nursing rates obtained ex parte by certain Blue Cross
investigators. In fact, before Holloway even released her findings, Blue
Cross's in-house counsel, the same individuals who were opposing
Nightingale's request, actually edited Holloway's opinion. Except for
ordering additional reimbursement for a few hours of what she found to
be "medically necessary" private-duty nursing following the extraction
of the IV, Holloway completely agreed with Blue Cross's initial
evaluation of the case.47
After Holloway made her findings, Nightingale again filed suit in the
district court. After conducting a bench trial, the district court entered
findings in favor of Nightingale. Specifically, the court ordered full
reimbursement for Nightingale's services, along with substantial prejudgment interest. Blue Cross then filed an appeal to the Eleventh
Circuit, and Nightingale filed a petition for attorney's fees and expenses
pursuant to ERISA's section 502(g)(1).'
The issues presented to the court were as follows: (1) whether the
district court applied the proper standard in reviewing Blue Cross's
administrative decision; (2) whether the district court erred as a matter
of law in ordering Blue Cross to pay Nightingale their original hourly
rate; (3) whether the district court erred in holding that after the IV was
removed, the in-home nursing care was still medically necessary; and (4)
whether the court abused its discretion in applying Alabama's interest
statute and awarding pre-judgment interest in this case.49

46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1480.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
41 F.3d at 1480.
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In relation to the first issue, Blue Cross argued that the district court
should have applied the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard
of review when deciding this case. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the
United States Supreme Court had held that as a general rule, courts
should review claims administrators' denials of ERISA benefits under a
de novo standard. 0 Specifically, in Firestone, the Supreme Court held
that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review was often too
lenient, in that it would "afford less protection to employees and their
beneficiaries than they enjoyed before ERISA was enacted.""'
Consequently, the decision in Firestone provided for the use of the
arbitrary and capricious standard only in the specific case where the
plan document explicitly vested the claims administration with
discretion to "construe disputed or doubtful terms." 2 Even if the plan
granted this discretion to the claims administrator, the Supreme Court
stated that deference in such situations was greatly diminished when
the claims administrator was acting under a conflict of interest."
Thus, if a conflict of interest was established, the burden shifted to the
administrator to prove that his or her interpretation of the plan was not
tainted by self-interest."
In analyzing the present case, the Eleventh Circuit recited the facts
of the case and found that there was ample evidence to show that the
administrator was laboring under a conflict of interest when she made
her findings. Since Blue Cross was unable to carry their burden of
showing that their decision was not tainted by self-interest, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the administrator's award was not entitled to the
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of review, and instead, the
more stringent de novo review was correctly used by the district court. 5
In finding that the district court utilized the correct standard of
review, the court went on to find that the district court's decision
concerning the correct charges to be paid, which services were "medically
necessary," as well as awarding prejudgment interest against Blue
Cross, were all correct findings, and as such, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the judgment of the district court in its entirety.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1480-81 (citing Firestone v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989)).
Id. at 1481 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id.; see also Lee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 10 F.3d 1547, 1549-52 (11th Cir. 1994).
41 F.3d at 1481-82.
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B. Pre-emption
In Variety Children's Hospital,Inc. v. Century Medical Health Plan,
Inc.," Variety Children's Hospital, Inc. ("Variety") brought a four-count
complaint against Century Medical Health Plan ("Century") seeking
recovery of the cost of medical services they provided to a patient. In
Count I, Variety alleged violations of ERISA, and in Counts II and III,
they alleged fraud, misrepresentation, and unfair claims settlement
practices, all of which were in violation of Florida statutes. Lastly, in
Count IV, Variety alleged the claim of promissory estoppel. The district
court dismissed Count I, without prejudice, holding that Variety did not
exhaust their administrative remedies under ERISA prior to bringing
this lawsuit. The court then dismissed Counts II, III, and IV as being
pre-empted by the ERISA statute.
Shortly thereafter, Variety filed its
67
appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.

Juan Carlos Rios was a young child who suffered from acute lymphoblastic leukemia. Over a period of two and a half years, he was
admitted to Variety Children's Hospital on at least twenty occasions,
including his final admission on December 3, 1992. The Rios were a
member of the health maintenance organization plan issued by Century.
Each time Juan Carlos was admitted for treatment, Century certified
him for such care. On his final admission, however, the doctors at
Variety decided to treat Juan Carlos with bone marrow transplants and
initiated high doses of precursor chemotherapy. Century determined
that this treatment was "experimental" and, therefore, was not covered
by their policy. The doctors at Variety went ahead and treated Juan
Carlos despite the denial of medical coverage. Unfortunately, Juan
Carlos died shortly thereafter, and Variety obtained an assignment of
claims from Juan Carlos' parents and sued Century in the four-count
complaint cited above." After reviewing all of the evidence in this
case, and the legal standards to be applied, the Eleventh Circuit upheld
the district court's decision in its entirety.
First, the Eleventh Circuit noted that they had repeatedly held that
plaintiffs must exhaust their administrative remedies under a covered
benefit plan prior to bringing an ERISA claim in federal court.59 Thus,
the district court's dismissal of Count I, without prejudice, was affrmed.

56. 57 F.3d 1040 (11th Cir. 1995).
57. Id. at 1041.
58. Id. at 1041-42.
59. Id at 1042 (citing Byrd v. MacPapers, Inc., 961 F.2d 157 (11th Cir. 1992); Springer
v. Wal-Mart Assocs. Group Health Plan, 908 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1990); Mason v.
Continental Group, Inc., 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1087 (1986)).
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In relation to Counts II and III alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and
unfair claim settlement practices in violation of the Florida state laws,
Century maintained that these claims were pre-empted by the ERISA
claim in Count I. The Eleventh Circuit stated that the pre-emption
provisions of ERISA provided that ERISA "shall supersede any and all
state laws insofar as they many now or hereafter relate to the employment plan.' ° Thus, if the state law claim has any type of "connection
with or reference to" the plan, then that state law claim would be preempted by the ERISA statute.6 '
Since all the claims alleged in plaintiff's Counts II and III centered on
the issue of coverage under the plan, and if the treatment given the
child was determined to be "experimental" and there excluded from
coverage, the court found there was definitely a link between the state
law claims and the ERISA
plan. Thus, Counts II and III were correctly
62
dismissed as pre-empted.
In relation to Variety's promissory estoppel claim, the court found that
although Variety was alleging they had relied on Century's promise in
the past to pay for Juan Carlos' medical bills, in actuality, the issue to
be determined was truly whether the treatment rendered was "experimental." As such, the promissory estoppel claim was, in fact, related to
the benefits of the plan and, thus, was also pre-empted by ERISA.
C.

PrejudgmentInterest Under ERISA
Another interesting ERISA case addressed by the Eleventh Circuit
this survey year was that of Smith v. American International Life
Assurance Co." In Smith, after the death of her husband, the plaintiff
submitted a claim to American International Life Assurance Company
of New York ("AILACNY") to recover benefits under an accidental death
insurance policy provided by her employer and governed by ERISA.
After AILACNY denied Smith's claim, Smith filed suit seeking to recover
the accidental benefits. After a bench trial, the district court awarded
the plaintiff judgment for the benefits and also provided her with
prejudgment interest at 12 percent per annum and postjudgment
interest at 3.54 percent per annum. AILACNY then appealed the
district court's finding to the Eleventh Circuit, but the only issue
addressed by the Eleventh Circuit on appeal was whether the district

60. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988)).
61. Id. (citations omitted).
62.

Id.

63. 50 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 1995).
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court erred in utilizing certain rates for prejudgment and postjudgment
interest.6
The Eleventh Circuit started out their opinion by noting that their
standard of review in questions of prejudgment interest under ERISA
was limited to abuse of discretion.6" A review of the district court
award showed that the judge had actually utilized local state law
prejudgment and postjudgment interest rates in the determining the
interest to be paid by AILACNY. AILACNY contended, however, that
in the absence of evidence pointing to a different rate that more
accurately compensated the plaintiff, the rate prescribed in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961(a) for postjudgment interest on federal judgments should also be
applied as the prejudgment interest rate under ERISA.' Needless to
say, if the district court had used the calculation as provided by section
1961, the interest rate charged to AILACNY would have been much less.
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that some other circuit courts had
approved the use of section 1961(a)s postjudgment rate to compute
prejudgment rates.67 The court went on to state, however, that section
1961(a) only mandated the rate for postjudgment interest and did not
speak directly to prejudgment rates. Furthermore, under the law of the
Eleventh Circuit, the "award of any amount of pre-judgment interest in
case is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial
an ERISA
6
court."

Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit found that the district court should
have discretion in determining prejudgment interest rates, as well as
postjudgment interest rates, and that they would not require in this
circuit that district courts utilize section 1961(a) in computing such
interest. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit found that reliance on state
law statutes in order to fill in "gaps in ERISA law," was perfectly within
the district court's purview. Thus, the district court's findings concerning prejudgment and postjudgment interest to be awarded in this case
were affirmed.
V. CONCLUSION
As can be seen by a review of the cases cited above, the Eleventh
Circuit continues to be one of the leading circuits in understanding and
developing the area of traditional labor law. The issues involved in the

64. Id. at 957.
65. Id.; see also Moon v. American Home Assurance Co., 888 F.2d 86 (11th Cir. 1989).
66. 50 F.3d at 957-58.

67. Id. at 958 (citations omitted).
68. Id. (citing Nightingale v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 41 F.3d 1476, 1484 (11th Cir.
1995) (citations omitted)).
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cases this past survey year show how specialized this area of law is
becoming. In order to be proficient, attorneys who practice in this area
of law need to familiarize themselves in detail with the applicable
statutes cited above and continue to stay abreast of the Eleventh
Circuit's interpretation of these statutes.

